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Curtis: Of Arms and the Militia

OF ARMS AND THE MILITIA: GUN REGULATION BY DEFINING
“ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT”
Edward J. Curtis, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Recent mass shootings have placed pressure on Congress and
state legislatures to regulate semi-automatic rifles and handguns in the
interest of public safety.1 However, the Second Amendment provides
that, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”2 There is no obvious public safety exception.
Semi-automatic rifles, handguns, and other kinds of arms can
be regulated more effectively by defining the “ordinary military
equipment” militia members are expected to provide. This may be
accomplished using the rationale employed by the United States
Supreme Court in its 1939 decision of United States v. Miller,3 which

*

Edward J. Curtis, Jr., is an attorney who retired from the Office of the Attorney
General for the State of New York after more than twenty-five years of service. In
the course of his work in that office, Mr. Curtis defended the constitutionality of
several New York State statutes concerning psychiatric treatment, including
Kendra's Law for Assisted Outpatient Treatment, Governor Pataki's Sexually Violent
Predator initiative, and the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. Mr. Curtis
would like to thank his friend and colleague, June Duffy, for her comments on an
early draft of this article.
1
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 2020 at 2, 18-19 (2021). The Federal Bureau of Investigation designated
forty shootings in 2020 as "active shooter" incidents, which is defined as "one or
more individuals . . . killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area." Id. at
2. The report notes that "[i]mplicit in this definition is the shooter's use of a firearm."
Id.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“[I]t is not within judicial notice that [a short-barreled
shotgun] is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense.” (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154, 158
(1840))).
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upheld the National Firearms Act of 1934. 4 The Firearms Act
regulated automatic weapons, including machine guns, short-barreled
shotguns, and short-barreled rifles, by requiring possessors to register
them and pay a substantial tax. 5 In its 2008 decision of District of
Columbia v. Heller,6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in
Miller.7
In Heller, the Supreme Court found that the Second
Amendment protected an individual's right to keep and bear arms.8
The Court in Heller stated that Miller “stands only for the proposition
that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to
certain types of weapons” and that it “does not protect those weapons
not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,
such as short-barreled shotguns.”9 Thus, the rationale employed in
Miller is still effective and shows how certain types of weapons may
be regulated.
I.

UPHOLDING THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

In Miller, criminal charges brought against two men found in
possession of a short-barreled shotgun were dismissed by the district
court on the ground that the National Firearms Act violated the Second
Amendment.10 The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
decision and upheld the Firearms Act by ruling that it could not take
judicial notice that the Act did not have a “reasonable relation to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” and therefore, it
could not “say that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right to
keep and bear” weapons such as short-barreled shotguns.11
The Court’s ruling in Miller offers Congress and state
legislatures powerful tools to ensure their gun regulations are upheld
by the courts. It was Congress which determined in 1934 that shortbarreled shotguns were “weapons not typically possessed by law-

4

26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62.
See id.
6
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7
Id. at 621-22, 624.
8
Id. at 591, 595.
9
Id. at 623, 625.
10
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1939).
11
Id. at 178.
5
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abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”12 Prior to that time shortbarreled shotguns were legal to obtain and possess. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court indicated that a legitimate object of the National
Firearms Act could be Congress's intention to preserve the militia and
make it more efficient.
A layperson reading Miller might think that the decision
merely required the defendants to prove that the military used machine
guns and short-barreled rifles and shotguns. The Supreme Court stated
in Heller that this “would be a startling reading of the [Miller] opinion,
since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on
machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional,
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.” 13 Miller's reference to
“ordinary military equipment,” Heller explained, meant arms “of the
kind in common use at the time.”14 As short-barreled shotguns could
legally be purchased and possessed before the 1934 Firearms Act,
Miller and Heller indicate that Congress and state legislatures can
define what ordinary military equipment is in common use so long as
those legislative bodies are crafting such definitions for the
preservation and efficiency of a well-regulated militia.15
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o
raise and support armies.”16 The Constitution also gives Congress the
power “[t]o provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”17 As the
Supreme Court explained in Heller, “the militia is assumed by Article
I already to be in existence.”18 The militia in colonial America was
understood to consist of “all able-bodied men.”19 Armies, by contrast,
must be created.20

12

Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
Id. at 624.
14
Id. at 624-25.
15
See id. at 622.
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
17
Id.
18
Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (emphasis in original).
19
Id. at 580-81, 596.
20
Id. at 596.
13
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DESCRIBING “ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT”

In Miller, when upholding the National Firearms Act, the
Supreme Court referred to Aymette v. State,21 an 1840 decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court. The court in Aymette upheld, against a
challenge under the Tennessee Constitution's version of the Second
Amendment, the conviction of a man who, while uttering threats
against another man for whom he was searching, was found to have
violated Tennessee law by concealing a knife under his clothing. 22
Although Aymette was decided 180 years ago, it contains useful
legal analysis distinguishing military weapons. Unlike Miller in 1939
or Heller in 2008, in 1840, the states periodically mustered their
militias for the purpose of training them. 23 Volunteers from the militia
supplemented the professional army on military expeditions. 24 At the
time Aymette was decided, the Georgia State Militia was assisting the
U.S. Army in the Second Seminole War.25 Volunteers from the militia
“provided the bulk of the manpower to fight the Mexican War, Civil
War, and the Spanish-American War.”26 The court in Aymette
understood what was expected of the militia.
Suppressing
insurrections and repelling invasions was, in 1840, an imaginable
objective for the militia.
The court in Aymette specifically held that the legislature had
the right “to prohibit the wearing, or keeping weapons dangerous to
the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized
warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence.” 27 In its
opinion, the court distinguished between those weapons “which are
usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the
hands of the robber or assassin,” which the court described as “useless

21

Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840).
Id. at 155, 161-62.
23
See generally GIAN GENTILE, MICHAEL E. LINICK, & MICHAEL SHURKIN, THE
EVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY POLICY FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO THE PRESENT
13-28 (2017) (hereinafter G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY).
24
Id. at 18.
25
JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR 1835-1842
(University Press of Florida ed., 1985).
26
G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 18.
27
Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) at 159.
22
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in war,” and “ordinary military equipment” used “in civilized
warfare.”28
Additionally, the court noted that the militia's military duties
could not be accomplished with concealed weapons.29 Arms for the
common defense “must necessarily be borne openly; so that a
prohibition to bear them openly, would be a denial of the right
altogether.”30
Accordingly, by using the rationale set out in Miller, Congress
and each state legislature can use objective military considerations to
regulate the “ordinary military equipment” which its militia members
are expected to provide when called. 31 Regulation using military
considerations can reasonably be attributed to an intent on the
legislature's part to preserve and promote the efficiency of its militia.
III.

SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF MILLER IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS

There is a reasonable explanation as to why Congress or state
legislatures did not choose to define “ordinary military equipment” in
their legislation earlier. In 1942, soon after Miller was decided, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Cases v. United
States,32 affirmed the conviction of a man, who, having previously
been convicted of a felony, was charged with possessing a revolver in
violation of the Federal Firearms Act of 1934.33 In the course of its
opinion the First Circuit criticized the Miller holding as “already
outdated, in spite of the fact that it was formulated only three and a half
years ago, because of the well-known fact that in the so called
'Commando Units' some sort of military use seems to have been found
for almost any modern lethal weapon.”34 Instead, the First Circuit
found that the man was not a member of any military organization and
the Second Amendment did not bar the Firearms Act.35

28

Id. at 158.
Id. at 159-60.
30
Id. at 160-61; see also Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
31
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
32
131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
33
Id. at 925.
34
Id. at 922.
35
Id. at 923.
29
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There are at least three problems with the criticism of the Miller
holding by the First Circuit in Cases.36 The first is that the First
Circuit's analysis equated the unorganized militia with a company of
the regular army.37 The militia is a class of individuals who are not
organized and are not subject to military discipline, unlike the regular
army.38 The second problem with the First Circuit's analysis is that it
equated members of the militia with “Commando Units,” which are
elite organizations of soldiers within the regular army.39 Members of
the militia cannot be assumed to have any military training, unlike the
members of “Commando Units.”40 Finally, the First Circuit noted that
there was some military usefulness for “almost any modern lethal
weapon.”41 This overlooked the definition of “ordinary military
equipment” contained in Miller, which excluded from the protection
of the Second Amendment certain weapons that have a military use,
including machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled
rifles.42
In his brief in Miller, the Solicitor General had argued in the
alternative that the Second Amendment was a “collective right.” 43 The
Miller decision did not mention this argument. 44 However, after the
First Circuit's decision in Cases, the “collective rights” theory was
adopted by several circuit courts of appeals in upholding gun

36

Id. at 922.
Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (“[T]he Militia
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense”), with CLAYTON R. NEWELL, REGULAR ARMY, THE UNITED STATES ARMY,
A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY, at 180 (2002) (“[t]hat portion of the army in the fulltime service of the federal government.”).
38
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
39
EDWARD LUTTWAK AND STUART KOEHL, COMMANDO, THE DICTIONARY OF
MODERN WAR, at 136 (1991) (“The term [“Commando”] is now applied officially to
units of the British Royal Marines, and unofficially to many other elite units trained
for special operations.”).
40
Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
41
Id.
42
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
43
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008).
44
See generally Miller, 307 U.S. at 174-83.
37
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regulations.45 The collective rights theory was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Heller.46
Another question is why the Supreme Court did not state in
Heller that Congress or the state legislatures could use objective
military considerations to regulate firearms. The federal courts cannot
issue so-called “advisory opinions” or make any decision that would
not affect the rights of the litigants before them. 47 Since Heller could
be resolved without further analysis of the Second Amendment, no
further discussion of the right was necessary. The Supreme Court did
note that the Second Amendment right “was not unlimited” and that
the Court did “not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.” 48
In its conclusion, the Court in Heller stated that, “the
Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for
combating [the problem of handgun violence], including some
measures regulating handguns.”49 The Court referred to its earlier
statement that it recognized “another important limitation” in Miller's
statement “that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common
use at the time,’” which the Court considered “fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and
unusual weapons.’”50
Finally, there is the question of the militia's usefulness at this
time. When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the United States
was confronted with a number of potential enemies, including Britain,
France, Spain, and various hostile Indian tribes. 51 Today the United
States has no close foreign enemies. The militia is no longer mustered
and there does not seem to be any need for it. Nevertheless, the Second
45

United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases
indicating that the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals had
adopted the “collective rights model” of the Second Amendment).
46
Heller, 554 U.S. at 591 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find
that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.”).
47
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (“Early in its history,
this Court held that it had no power to issue advisory opinions.”).
48
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
49
Id. at 636.
50
Id. at 627.
51
See generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802 at 40-45 (Free
Press ed., 1975).
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Amendment assumes that the militia is necessary to the security of a
free state and the Supreme Court permits legislative regulation of
ordinary military equipment, whether or not the militia is needed.
IV.

THE TYPES OF REGULATION HELLER AND MILLER SUPPORT

To summarize, the findings in Miller indicated that the
Supreme Court would uphold legislation reasonably related “to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.”52 The Court in
Heller stated that a legislature could not prohibit “an entire class of
arms.”53 The protection of the Second Amendment extended to
“certain types of weapons” which were “in common use at the time”
and which could be classified as “ordinary military equipment.” 54 The
protection of the Second Amendment did not extend to “dangerous and
unusual weapons” of a kind “not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes.”55 The Court in Heller further stated that
the weapons could be used for self-protection, though it referred to
protection of “the hearth and home,” and added that it did not read the
Second Amendment as permitting arms to be carried “for any sort of
confrontation.”56 The particular restrictions permitted by the decision
in Miller, and endorsed in Heller, affected the type of action the
firearms used and the firearms' barrel length. 57
The United States Constitution, in Article 1, Section 8, reserves
to the states the right to appoint officers and train their militias. 58
United States military policy no longer relies on the militia. 59 The
militia “is primarily a state institution.” 60 Moreover, the United States

52

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
554 U.S. at 628.
54
Id. at 623-25.
55
Id. at 627.
56
Id. at 595, 636.
57
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62 (containing the National Firearms Act of 1934); United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (discussing short-barreled shotguns);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (discussing
“machineguns”).
58
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
59
See generally, G. GENTILE, ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY.
60
S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 478
(1917) (A member of U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps discusses the militia
in the context of writs of habeas corpus brought against the federal government “for
53
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government “has only a limited control over [the militia] for the limited
purposes expressed by the Constitution.”61 By making legislative
findings concerning the likely composition of its militia, the extent of
training its militia members probably have, and the firearms and other
weapons best suited for the duties that its untrained militia could be
expected to accomplish, Congress or a state legislature could regulate
firearms and other weapons with laws that the courts would be
reluctant to overturn.62
A.

Legislative Findings

As a general matter, courts consider legislative bodies to be
better equipped to collect evidence and make determinations about the
best way to enact laws to achieve a given objective. This article
recommends that legislative bodies make legislative findings to define
“ordinary military equipment” in order to preserve and promote the
efficiency of a well-regulated militia. 63 When Congress or a state
legislature makes legislative findings, the courts are inclined to defer
to the legislative intent expressed in those findings. 64
The inclination to defer to legislative determinations is
particularly pronounced in the area of military decision-making. As a
matter of policy, courts have been historically reluctant to secondguess military decisions because these decisions require expert
knowledge and the courts believe that they do not have the expertise
to make military decisions. 65 For example, in its 1972 decision of

the release of some member of the forces subjected to the call” usually on the ground
of minority).
61
Id.
62
Although this article recommends that the “ordinary military equipment” be
defined by the legislature, it is worth noting that Miller upheld the 1934 Firearms Act
without referring to the Act's legislative history. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“[I]t is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment
or that its use would contribute to the common defense.”).
63
Id.
64
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (upholding statute
authorizing commitment for sexually violent predators and noting that the Supreme
Court “ordinarily defer[s] to the legislature's stated intent”).
65
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area
of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence . . . [than]
professional military judgments.”).
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Gilligan v. Morgan,66 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
“training, weaponry and orders” of the Ohio National Guard following
the Kent State shootings, noting that “congressional and executive
authority to prescribe and regulate the National Guard . . . clearly
precludes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters.” 67
B.

The Preservation and Efficiency of the Militia

The phrase “the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia” was not explained and does not appear to be a term of art. 68
Accordingly, the words “preservation” and “efficiency” are entitled to
their normal and ordinary meaning. 69
The normal and ordinary meaning of “preservation” is to save
and maintain what already exists and to protect it from destruction or
degradation.70 While the Second Amendment makes no reference to
public safety, the use of the word “preservation” suggests that ensuring
the safety of militia members would be a reasonable consideration of
the legislature.71
The normal and ordinary meaning of “efficiency” suggests that
an objective is achieved effectively with a minimum of waste, expense,
or effort.72 This, in turn, indicates that in regulating the militia a
legislature can examine the militia's history, duties, and
accomplishments.

66

Id.
Id. at 7-8 (internal punctuation omitted).
68
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008).
69
Cf. id. at 577 (“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
technical meaning.”).
70
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (5th Ed. 1979); Preserve, THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 980 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “preserve” as the ability “to keep
safe from injury, peril, or other adversity”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “preserve” as the ability “to keep safe from
injury, harm, or destruction”).
71
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“[T]he preservation and
efficiency of a well regulated militia.”).
72
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 440 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “efficient” as
“[a]cting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary
effort”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 1988)
(defining “efficient” as being “productive without waste”).
67
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The Likely Composition of the Militia

A legislature's first step in regulating the militia is to determine
the militia's likely composition. There is a tendency today to use the
word “militia” as a synonym for any armed gang. However, it is
apparent from the language of the Constitution and the Second
Amendment that the purpose of the militia in the United States of
America is to protect the federal government and the individual
states.73 Individuals or groups cannot organize their own militias. 74
Each state is in control of its own militia.
The founders initially favored militias because they distrusted
standing armies.75 At least some of the founders believed that, to the
extent that the United States would need military power, such a need
would be intermittent and could be satisfied by the militia. 76 In the
Federalist Papers, James Madison predicted that the United States'
militia could provide a force “near half a million of citizens with arms
in their hands . . . .”77 By way of comparison, in 1790 the population
of the United States was less than 4 million. 78 In 2010, the population
of the United States was more than 308 million. 79 Extrapolating from
James Madison's number, the United States' total militia would easily
number in the millions and, in fact, many individual state militias
would number in the millions. 80
Unfortunately, soon after the Bill of Rights was ratified, it
became evident that the militia did not have the discipline or
professionalism needed to satisfy the military needs of the new
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State . . . .”).
74
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (“[T]he Second
Amendment . . . does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary
organizations.” (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886))).
75
Id. at 595.
76
Id.
77
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
78
1790 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1790_fast_fa
cts.html.
79
2010 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/2010_fast_fa
cts.html.
80
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (proposing that the militia of the United
States could produce a force of “near half a million of citizens . . . .”).
73
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country.81 The United States has had a standing army since soon after
the Constitution was ratified. However, the militia itself still exists and
each state is in the control of its militia.
Traditionally, the militia included “all subjects and citizens
capable of bearing arms, regardless of age or parental authority.” 82 The
United States Code sets out a subset of the militia by defining it as “all
able-bodied males at least 17 years of age. . . and under 45 years of age
. . . .”83 The United States Code divides this subset of the militia into
the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the
Naval Militia, and the unorganized militia, which consists of the
members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or
Naval Militia.84 In 2018, 18 million Americans, or roughly seven
percent of the population, were veterans.85 It can be fairly deduced
from these statutory provisions and census numbers that most
members of the unorganized militia have no military training.
D.

Likely Duties of the Militia

A legislature's second step in regulating the militia is to
determine what kind of duties militia members might be called to
undertake. Regular soldiers are full-time paid professional soldiers. 86
Regulars are members of the regular army, or standing army, of a
nation.87 Irregulars are not part of a regular army, or standing army,
81

See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, AUTUMN OF THE BLACK SNAKE 123-84
(2017); see also G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 9 (regarding the
militia's “unpredictability in battle”).
82
S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L. J. 471, 471
(1917).
83
10 U.S.C. § 246(a).
84
Id. § 246(b).
85
JONATHAN VESPA, THOSE WHO SERVED: AMERICA'S VETERANS FROM WORLD
WAR II TO THE WAR ON TERROR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP. NO. ACS-43 at 1
(2020).
86
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1041 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “regular” as
“belonging to or constituting the permanent army of a nation …. [a] soldier belonging
to a regular army”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (9th ed.
1988) (defining “regular” as “one who is regular: as . . . a soldier in a regular army”).
87
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1041 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “regular
army” as “[t]he permanent standing army of a nation or state”); MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “regular army”
as “a permanently organized body constituting the standing army of a state”).
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and are raised for a special purpose. 88 Militia members are not part of
the standing army and are called only in case of emergency. 89
Accordingly, members of the militia who are called to service are
irregular soldiers.
As a historical matter, the performance of militias through
United States history has been inconsistent. In 1794 the Whiskey
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania was subdued effectively by a force
of 13,000 militiamen led by George Washington and provided by
Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 90 However, the
militia were of little use during the War of 1812.91 As the borders of
the United States expanded westward, citizens saw less need for the
militia, and musters of the militia waned and eventually expired. 92 For
most of the 19th Century, the United States augmented its military
expeditions not with militia units themselves, but with volunteers from
the militia.93
From these facts, certain deductions can be made concerning
“the preservation and efficiency of a well regulated militia.” 94 If the
militia was called, the potential number of members responding would
be in the millions. Furthermore, most militia members would have no
military training or experience. The most that the government could
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “irregular” as
“[a] soldier, such as a guerrilla, who is not a member of a regular military force”);
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 640 (9th ed. 1988) (defining
“irregular” as “[a] soldier who is not a member of a regular military force”).
89
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 796 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “militia” as
“the armed citizenry as distinct from the regular army”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 753 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “militia” as “the whole body
of able-bodied male citizens declared by law as being subject to call to military
service”).
90
G. GENTILE, ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 15 (“The militia performed below
expectations.”).
91
Id. at 19 (explaining that in 1814 the U.S. Army, augmented by the militia, was
inadequate to stop a force of 5,000 British regulars from invading Washington, D.C.,
and burning the White House).
92
3 JOHN E. JESSUP, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY: STUDIES OF THE
HISTORY, TRADITIONS, POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES
IN WAR AND PEACE 2074-75 (1994); BARRY M. STENTIFORD, THE AMERICAN HOME
GUARD: THE STATE MILITIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6-7 (2002) (“The martial
enthusiasm needed for an effective militia often waned, however, at the local, state,
and federal levels.”).
93
G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 18.
94
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
88
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expect of those militia members who provided themselves with
“ordinary military equipment” would be that they could load, fire, and
maintain their own equipment.
E.

Ordinary Military Equipment

Several observations can be made about the term “ordinary
military equipment.”95 First, the decisions in Miller and Heller
indicate that individual states can make their own decisions concerning
what constitutes ordinary military equipment, given their reliance on
Aymette, which upheld a Tennessee law concerning concealed
weapons.96 Furthermore, as the court in Aymette explained, ordinary
military equipment is intended to be carried openly and obviously,
rather than concealed. 97 There is no reason for a citizen who is
mustered to protect the state to conceal the fact that he or she is bearing
arms. This indicates that so-called “concealed carry” statutes 98 have
no support in the Second Amendment. 99 Naturally, a state legislature
may choose to allow its citizens to carry concealed weapons, but the
Second Amendment does not require it.
Another important point is that “ordinary military equipment”
means lethal weapons.100 While this observation may be distasteful, it

95

Id. at 178.
Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840).
97
Id. at 159 (“[T]he arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually
employed military equipment …. not . . . those weapons which are usually employed
in private broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber or assassin.”).
98
Editorial, Going National with Concealed Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2017, at A26.
99
As noted earlier, the Court in Heller stated that weapons permitted under the
Second Amendment could be used for self-protection. However, Heller referred to
protection of “the hearth and home,” and added that it did not read the Second
Amendment as permitting arms to be carried “for any sort of confrontation.” District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008).
100
The militia is described as “being necessary to the security of a free state . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. II. The function of the militia is to “execute the laws of the
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
The “basic personal firearm of soldiers” is the rifle. EDWARD LUTTWAK & STUART
KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 487 (1991). Soldiers may, on occasion,
use non-lethal weapons for specific purposes.
DAVID P. FIDLER, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, 21 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 51, 52, 55-60 (1999). Nevertheless, non-lethal weapons are not “ordinary military
equipment” in “common use at the time” as described in Heller and Miller. 554 U.S.
96
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also shows that incapacitating weapons, such as stun guns and
chemical sprays, or other kinds of non-military weapons, are not
protected by the Second Amendment and may be regulated without
violating the U.S. Constitution or federal law.
Finally, not every kind of military weapon is protected by the
Second Amendment. Only ordinary military equipment, and in
particular, “certain types of weapons” which were “in common use at
the time” are protected by the Second Amendment. 101 “[D]angerous
and unusual weapons” are not protected. 102 Machineguns, shortbarreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles are not protected by the
Second Amendment.103 Since Congress is given power to organize the
militia,104 and since most of the militia is unorganized,105 it can be
deduced that weapons requiring training and cooperation between or
among individuals, such as crew-served weapons, are also not
protected by the Second Amendment. Thus, ordinary military
equipment means such small arms as an individual could carry into
combat, chiefly rifles. 106 To a certain extent, other popular classes of
arms, in particular handguns, can be ordinary military equipment. 107
A legislature would be most knowledgeable about the likely
composition of its militia, the duties to which its militia would
probably be assigned, and the need to preserve its militia and promote
its efficiency. By using this knowledge, a legislature could well
determine that other types of weapons were not suitable as ordinary
military equipment.

at 596; 307 U.S. at 178. Suppressing insurrection and repulsing invaders requires
“ordinary military equipment” that can be lethal in effect.
101
Heller, 554 U.S. at 623-25.
102
Id. at 627.
103
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62; see Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (discussing shortbarreled shotguns); Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (discussing “machineguns”).
104
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o provide
for organizing arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . .”).
105
10 U.S.C. § 246(b).
106
See generally 25 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 44 (2000) (defining “small
arms” as weapons which could “be carried in the hand in combat”); EDWARD
LUTTWAK & STUART KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 487 (1991)
(defining “rifle” as “the basic personal firearm of soldiers”).
107
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is
invalid.”).
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In connection with this point it is worthwhile to review why the
Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia's handgun
regulation. The Court in Heller stated that a legislature could not
prohibit “an entire class of arms.”108 The Supreme Court noted several
considerations that made a handgun useful for self-defense within the
home, explaining that handguns were easier to store, may be easier to
use than long guns, and that handguns could be operated with one
hand.109 These considerations were suggested by amici.110
F.

Classes of Arms

As noted at the beginning of this article, following many wellpublicized mass shootings, legislatures have been under pressure to
regulate semi-automatic rifles and semi-automatic handguns. An
automatic firearm, such as a machine gun, is capable of firing rounds
continuously until its ammunition is exhausted, as long as the trigger
is depressed.111 A semi-automatic firearm fires a single round, ejects
the spent cartridge, and loads another round with each pull of the
trigger.112 Semi-automatic firearms are distinguished from other types
of firearms which require a manual action, such as a bolt action, to
eject the spent cartridge and load another round. 113 Semi-automatic
handguns are distinguished from revolvers, which are a type of

108

Id.
Id. at 629.
110
Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat a person using one will still have a hand
free to dial 911.”).
111
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 143 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “automatic”
as being “capable of firing continuously until ammunition is exhausted”); MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 118 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “automatic” as
“using either gas pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action for
repeatedly ejecting the empty cartridge shell, introducing a new cartridge, and firing
it”).
112
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 796 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “semiautomatic” as “ejecting the shell and loading the next round of ammunition
automatically after each shot has been fired”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1069 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “semi-automatic” as “employing gas
pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action to eject the empty cartridge
case after the first shot and load the next cartridge from the magazine but requiring
release and another pressure of the trigger for each successive shot”).
113
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 166 (9th ed. 1988) (defining
“bolt-action” as “loaded by means of a manually operated bolt”).
109
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handgun containing a cylinder with multiple chambers, each of which
is rotated into line with the barrel for firing. 114
G.

Taxing Certain Types of Arms

It is likely that, using the analysis the Supreme Court employed
in Miller, and which was re-affirmed in Heller, a legislature that made
appropriate findings could, in effect, regulate semi-automatic rifles,
semi-automatic handguns, and extended magazines to the extent that
they are not needed for use with the militia, and, accordingly, not
needed for non-military purposes. Some politicians have suggested
confiscating firearms.115 A more effective and less controversial way
to regulate semi-automatic rifles, semi-automatic handguns, and
extended magazines would be to employ registration and a stamp tax
of the kind used by Congress in the National Firearms Act of 1934 to
regulate machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled
rifles.116 In this manner possession of these kinds of weapons would
not be directly banned, but instead be made uneconomical.
V.

REGULATING ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT

With this background and using the analysis the Supreme Court
employed in Miller and Heller, a legislature could reasonably,
effectively, and without controversy, discourage possession of semiautomatic rifles. Assume, for example, that a legislature wishes to
regulate rifles to encourage its militia members to equip themselves
with rifles with manual actions, such as rifles using bolt actions, which
require that the users work the bolt after each shot to chamber another
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1058 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “revolver”
as “[a] pistol having a revolving cylinder with several cartridge chambers”);
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1010 (9th ed. 1988) (defining
“revolver” as a “handgun with a cylinder of several chambers brought successively
into line with the barrel and discharged with the same hammer”).
115
See, e.g., Heather Murphy, Beto O'Rourke and Pete Buttigieg Battle Over
Confiscating
Assault
Weapons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/us/politics/beto-guns.html; Thomas Kaplan,
Cuomo to Press for Wider Curbs on Gun Access, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/nyregion/cuomo-to-propose-moreexpansive-ban-on-assault-weapons.html.
116
See 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (regarding transfer tax on firearms); see also § 5845(a)
(defining “firearm”).
114
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cartridge. The state legislature could begin by making legislative
findings concerning the members of its militia and the militia members'
likely level of military training and expertise. As demonstrated earlier,
if the militia was mustered, its members could easily number in the
millions. Of these members, only a small minority would have any
military training and experience. Most of the militia members who
had military experience would be out of condition and practice.
The legislature could then make findings by identifying the
ordinary military equipment that its militia members could be expected
to use effectively. As noted earlier, since the militia would be engaged
in military duties, the ordinary military equipment would have to be
lethal.117
Nevertheless, the fact that militia members need lethal military
equipment does not necessarily mean that militia members would need
to have semi-automatic weapons. Untrained and inexperienced militia
members using semi-automatic rifles could easily fire repeatedly
without discipline, waste ammunition, and endanger each other. In
fact, the larger the militia force, the more likely that such accidents
would occur.118
A legislature could reasonably find that, given the large number
of militia members and each member's likely level of training,
experience, and conditioning, it would be better if militia members
were equipped with rifles with manual actions. A militia member who
can fire only one shot before working the action could reasonably be
expected to choose what target he or she is shooting at, to aim at that
target more carefully, and consider what he or she is doing before
pulling the trigger. Restricting ordinary military equipment to manualaction rifles may not eliminate accidents, but it would probably reduce
those accidents.
The legislature could make findings on several other
uncontroversial military considerations, such as the need to
standardize kinds of ammunition to make resupply easier, and militia
members' need for arms that are reliable and easy to use and maintain.
Once these legislative findings are made, the state legislature could
117

See supra text accompanying note 100.
Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Unintentional Firearm Deaths in the United
States 2005–2015, INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY, Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 1, 2, 4 (presenting data
concerning unintentional firearm fatalities in sixteen states reporting to the National
Violent Death Reporting System).
118
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then make laws that encourage possession of the types of weapons it
feels are best suited to the needs of its militia while discouraging other
types, such as, in this example, semi-automatic rifles.
In a similar way, a legislature could discourage possession of
semi-automatic handguns. These types of handguns frequently have
large-capacity magazines, are easily concealed and adapted to criminal
purposes. Under Heller, a legislature cannot ban an entire class of
firearms, such as handguns. 119 It can, however, discourage possession
of semi-automatic handguns and encourage possession of revolvers,
which chamber cartridges using smaller-capacity cylinders rather than
magazines.
Semi-automatic rifles have certain advantages, and manualaction rifles have other advantages.120 Likewise, semi-automatic
handguns have certain advantages, and revolvers have other
advantages.121 After hearings a legislature is unlikely to find a
consensus about what type of rifle or handgun would best promote the
efficiency of a largely untrained, inexperienced, and unreliable militia.
However, making decisions about the best way to accomplish an
objective is the function of the legislature. 122
If a state enacts this type of firearm regulation, supported by
legislative findings, a court will probably reject a constitutional
challenge to the regulation. The state legislature is not violating the
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“[A] complete
prohibition of [handguns] is invalid.”)
120
10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 65 (1902-1903) (“Bolt-action [rifles
are] efficient, reliable, and easy to manufacture and maintain . . . .”). Semi-automatic
rifles ordinarily use a gas-operated autoloading system that is more complicated than
a manual-action rifle. 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 46 (2000). However,
semiautomatic rifles, which are loaded from a 20- or 30-round magazine, fire at each
pull of the trigger, allow a higher rate of fire than do manual-action rifles. Id. at 4647.
121
Semi-automatic pistols, like semi-automatic rifles, are loaded using magazines
which can hold more than ten cartridges. Id. at 46. Revolvers, by contrast, use
rotating cylinders and normally hold six cartridges. Id. at 47. In addition, revolvers
can chamber different sizes of cartridges, depending on the caliber of the revolver.
Grant Cunningham, 5 Advantages of the Revolver, GUN DIGEST (Sep. 10, 2013),
https://gundigest.com/article/5-advantages-of-the-revolver.
122
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Beach Commc’n, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (“The
Constitution presumes that . . . even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979))).
119
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constitutional right to keep and bear arms. It is merely regulating arms
to preserve its militia and promote its efficiency. The regulation would
not affect the individual right to self-protection described in Heller
because any firearm or weapon that has a military purpose can be used
for protection “of hearth and home.”123
VI.

CONCLUSION

Obviously, this type of regulation will not end the likelihood
that firearms, whether acceptable for use by the militia or not, will be
used for crime. Manual-action rifles and revolvers are deadly
weapons. Nevertheless, this type of regulation could reduce the kind
of mass shootings perpetrated by single gunmen that the country has
seen in recent years.124 In addition, this type of regulation, to the extent
that it sets guidelines for the militia and the right to self-protection, will
be considerably easier to reconcile with the language of the Second
Amendment than the public safety argument, on which gun regulation
currently relies.

123

Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS
STATES IN 2020 at 2-4 (2021).
124
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